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Sammendrag 
Mange offentlige prosjekter finansieres med skatter som har negative virkninger på økonomien. 
Kostnadene av slike negative virkninger implementeres i nytte-kostnadsanalyser ved at kostnadene 
multipliseres med en faktor, MCF. Norge har benyttet en MCF lik 1.2 de senere årene.  
 
Skatter påvirker arbeidstilbudet negativt ved at både arbeidstiden og arbeidsdeltakelsen reduseres. 
Kleven og Kreiner (2006) viser at negative virkninger på deltakelsen i arbeidslivet fører til vesentlig 
høyere anslag på MCF. Anslagene for den Danske økonomien øker fra 1.29 til 2.20 i deres basis 
scenario. Min analyse viser imidlertid at MCF bør ligge i intervallet 1.04-1.10 for USA, og 1.06-1.16 
for Norge. Analysen viser også at negative virkinger av beskatning på deltakelse i arbeidslivet har en 
marginal effekt på MCF.  
 
Negative virkninger av beskatning på deltakelse i arbeidslivet er ifølge Kleven og Kreiner (2006) 
betydelige pga. en stor skattekile, som består av inntektsskatt og tap av sosiale overføringer, samt en 
vesentlig reduksjon i deltakelsen som følge av økt beskatning. De analyserer imidlertid ikke scenarioer 
der økt inntektsskatt kombineres med reduserte sosiale overføringer, eller økte overføringer til 
trygdemottakere som jobber. Slike endringer i overføringene ville motvirke den negative effekten på 
deltakelse. De studerer dessuten et sub-optimalt skattesystem der kostnadene ved å øke skatten er 
høyere enn gevinsten av sosiale overføringer. Dette vil påvirke beregninger av MCF ifølge Jacobs 
(2018).  
 
Min studie analyserer hvordan MCF påvirkes av deltakelse i arbeidslivet når skatter og sosiale 
overføringer tilpasses slik at velferden maksimeres. Studien finner som nevnt at MCF i Norge bør 
ligge i intervallet 1.06-1.16, og at negative effekter på deltakelse har en marginal effekt på anslaget på 
MCF. Forklaringen er at velferdsgevinsten per kroner investert i kollektive goder må matche 
velferdsgevinsten av å bruke kroner på sosiale overføringer. Målrettede sosiale overføringer til 
grupper med høyere nytte av inntekt øker avkastningskravet til offentlige prosjekter. Dermed økes 
MCF. Gevinsten av slike overføringer reduseres imidlertid om overføringen fører til lavere deltakelse i 
arbeidslivet. Negative effekter av lavere deltakelse motvirkes imidlertid ved å tilpasse systemet for 
overføringer. Dette forklarer hvorfor effekter av deltakelse på MCF er marginal. Forenklede 
forutsetninger innebærer at de numeriske resultatene bør tolkes som illustrasjoner.  
 
Tidligere studier benytter forskjellige definisjoner på MCF. Min studie bidrar ved å beregne en MCF-
faktor som implementerer det velferdsmaksimerende tilbudet av kollektive goder. En sammenlikning 
med denne faktoren og den mest brukte definisjonen av MCF, viser at begge målene gir om lag like 
anslag på MCF.     
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1. Introduction 
Most public projects are financed with tax revenue from distorting taxes. The cost of such distortions 
is incorporated into cost-benefit analyses of public projects by multiplying costs with a factor, MCF, 
or the Marginal Cost of public Funds. Labor supply is distorted as taxation affects both hours of work 
(intensive margin) and labor force participation (extensive margin). Kleven and Kreiner (2006) show 
that incorporation of extensive margin choices leads to a substantial increase in estimates of MCF, 
especially for large welfare state countries. Estimates for the Danish economy increase from 1.29 to 
2.20 within their basic scenario. The present study, however, estimate that MCF for a similar large 
welfare state country, Norway, should be in the interval 1.06- 1.16. Furthermore, the sudy shows that 
labor force participations choices have a marginal impact on MCF estimates when taxation is 
combined with social transfers designed to maximize welfare.               
  
The cost of raising tax revenue in the presence of extensive margin distortions is substantial for two 
reasons according to Kleven and Kreiner (2006). First, the effective tax rate which distorts labor force 
participation choices consists of both income taxation and loss of transfers. This effective tax rate is 
substantial in many countries according to Immervoll et al. (2007) and OECD (2009). Second, the 
empirical literature shows that variation in the supply of labor is mostly generated by changes in labor 
force participation by people at the lower end of the earnings distribution, see Heckman (1993), 
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), Eissa and Liebman (1996) and Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001). Indeed, 
a substantial share of intended recipients of welfare programs choose to work, see Moffitt (2003) and 
Currie (2006).  
   
Kleven and Kreiner (2006), however, do not consider reforms where income taxation is combined 
with reductions in social transfers to non-workers, or transfers to social welfare recipients that decide 
to work. Such adjustments in social transfers are likely to boost labor force participation, see Kostøl 
and Mongstad (2014), and hence, alleviate extensive margin distortions. Indeed, optimal tax systems 
should stimulate labor force participation by offering tax credits similar to the Earned Income Tax 
Credit implemented in the US, see Saez (2002) and Immervoll et al. (2007). Also, Kleven and Kreiner 
(2006) assume a sub- optimal tax system where the welfare cost of raising tax revenue exceeds the 
welfare gain of transfers to non-workers. Jacobs (2018) however shows that this assumption is crucial 
as a Diamond- based definition of MCF exceeds (equals) one when the welfare cost of raising tax 
revenue exceeds (equals) the welfare gain of transfers.  
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Several studies on optimal taxation show cases where redistribution imply that MCF equals one, or 
where the Samuelson rule holds, see e.g. Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), Boadway and Keen (1993), 
Kaplow (1996), Sandmo (1998), Christiansen (1981), Christiansen (2007) and Jacobs (2018). These 
studies assume that the government redistributes income by giving uniform transfers to all individuals. 
Uniform transfers and quasilinear preferences implies that the value of transfers, i.e. the value of 
money in the public sector, equals the average marginal utility of money in the private sector. Hence, 
MCF defined as the marginal value of money in the public sector divided by the average marginal 
value of money in the private sector equals one in this case, see Jacobs (2018). Sandmo (1998) shows 
that MCF is smaller than one when leisure is a normal good and taxation distort the supply of labor. 
An increase in uniform transfers lowers the supply of labor, and hence, expands the distortion. The 
value of money in the public sector is consequently reduced below the average marginal utility of 
money in the private sector, which implies that MCF is smaller than one.  
 
Most large welfare state countries however offer social transfers to targeted groups like e.g. disabled, 
sick and old aged. Such targeted transfers distort labor force participation, but is likely to improve 
welfare as less tax revenue are required to provide for the poor, see Akerlof (1978). Welfare 
maximizing targeted transfers should be set to eliminate inequality in the average social marginal 
value of income between tagged groups, see e.g. Viard (2001)1. Such transfers may however include 
negative transfers. Most countries exclude negative transfers, or lump-sum taxes, from their tax system 
to avoid potential social turmoil and riots connected to lump-sum taxes2. The average social marginal 
value of income for the poor group is higher than average within solutions where positive lump-sum 
taxes are excluded and the size of the poor group is sufficiently large according to Slack (2015). 
Hence, the value of transfers, i.e. the value of public funds, exceeds the average marginal value of 
money in the private sector when labor supply is unaffected by transfers in this case. This explains 
why the MCF exceeds one in the present study.   
 
The present study explores how MCF is influenced by extensive margin distortions when targeted 
social transfers are designed to maximize social welfare. The study contributes to the literature by 
calculating MCF for the Norwegian and the US economy within scenarios where transfers are non-
                                                     
1 Equal average marginal value of income between high- and low-income groups is inconsistent with empirical findings on 
reported happiness, see Deaton (2008) and Stevenson and Wolfers (2008). 
2 The Thatcher government imposed lump-sum taxes in 1990 in England. It created social turmoil and riots in several cities 
before it was abandoned later that year. One may argue that tax- credits within real- world tax systems acts as a uniform 
lump-sum subsidy, which can be reduced without creating social turmoil. This might be true for some countries. Reductions 
in the US earned income tax credit however collects taxes from low- and middle- income earners only, as the credit is phased 
out.  
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negative. The study shows that MCF lies between 1.07 and 1.17 (1.05 and 1.11) in scenarios of the 
Norwegian (the US) economy when extensive margin distortions are excluded. Implementing 
extensive margin distortions have a marginal impact on MCF estimates. The intuition is that such 
distortions contributes to lower the value of public funds. The value of public funds is however 
preserved as tranfers to non-workers, and tranfers to welfare recipients that choose to work, is 
adjusted. Calculations of MCF based on the modified Samuelson rule confirm these results. Results 
are based on a tailor made model framework with a simple specifications of individuals’ labor supply 
decisions, and a simple set of policy tools to facilitate numerical calculations. Hence, results should be 
interpreted as illustrations of the importance of targeted transfers in the presence of labor force 
participation choices. 
 
The model framework is presented in section 2. Section 3 present definitions of MCF. Results are 
presented in section 4, and section 5 concludes.  
2. The model framework   
The model framework is designed to calculate MCF when a welfare maximizing government allocates 
public funds to public goods provision. A linear income tax distorts the intensive and extensive margin 
labor/ leisure choice of individuals. The government is assumed to be able to perfectly separate 
between two groups of individuals. Individuals within both groups are working. Type 1 individuals are 
classified as healthy, and do not qualify for social transfers. Type 2 individuals are classified as 
disabled, and hence, is eligible for targeted social transfers. Transfers to non-working within the 
disabled group distort the extensive margin labor/ leisure choice. Transfers to working individuals 
within the disabled group contribute to neutralize this distortion.  
 
Positive lump-sum taxes are excluded from the model framework. Costs connected to social turmoil 
due to lump-sum taxes are also excluded. These exclusions represent the outcome of a welfare 
maximizing solution when costs connected to social turmoil due to positive lump-sum taxes are 
sufficiently large.   
2.1. The behavior of individuals  
There are two types of individuals in the economy with preferences for leisure, il , private 
consumption, ic , and consumption of public goods, z . Utility functions are identical for all 
individuals except for one feature. Type 2 individuals experience a loss of utility connected to entering 
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the labor market. This loss differs between type 2 individuals. Utility functions are quasilinear for 
consumption above a given level, cˆ .   
 
Individuals of type 1 and 2 differ with respect to productivity, which is given by their respective wage 
rates, iw . All 1n type 1 individuals are working. The higher type 1 wage rate implies a consumption 
level which exceeds cˆ . The utility function of type 1 individuals for consumption levels above cˆ , 1u , 
are given by   
 
(1) )()( 111 zflgcu ++= .  
 
The quasilinear utility function is chosen because the labor supply responsiveness of married women 
due to their husbands’ wage change is declining in the US, see Blau and Kahn (2007), and because 
estimates of the income elasticity on the supply of labor are close to zero in Norway, see Thoresen and 
Vattø (2015). Both )(zf and )( 1lg are increasing and strictly concave. Consumption is given by after 
tax wage income, where 1w equals the wage rate of type 1 individuals, 1h  equals hours of work, and t
equals the tax rate 
 
(2) 111 )1( hwtc −=  . 
 
The price of consumer goods is normalized to one. The time constraint of type 1 individuals is given 
by 
 
(3) 11 lTh −= . 
 
Individuals of type 1 maximize their utility, given by equation (1), conditional on their budget 
equation (2), and their time constraint, equation (3). First order conditions of this optimization 
problem imply that  
 
(4) 1=λ . 
 
The marginal utility of income,λ , equals one for all levels of consumption above cˆ .    
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The marginal rate of substitution between leisure and private consumption equals the after- tax wage 
rate. The quasi linear utility function implies that leisure is given by the tax rate, t.  
 
(6) )(11 tll =            01 ≥∂
∂
t
l
 
 
This illustrates the intensive margin distortion of the labor income tax. The marginal welfare 
cost of raising tax revenue by increasing the labor income tax exceeds one with such 
preferences. The indirect utility of type 1 individuals equals  
 
(7) )())(())(()1( 1111 zftlgtlTwtv ++−−= . 
 
Note that the choice of leisure is not influenced by the income effects of taxation. This 
assumption excludes tax base effects due to income effects, but simplifies calculations of 
MCF.  
 
The number of type 2 individuals equals 2n , and the number of working type 2 individuals 
equals wn2 . Type 2 individuals with a sufficiently low loss of utility connected to entering 
the labor market, are assumed to choose a fixed number of working hours, 2h . This 
assumption is based on empirical observations which uncover that almost no worker 
chooses low annual or weekly hours of work, see Eissa et al. (2004). Discrete entry is 
typically explained by fixed costs (both emotional and fixed working costs) connected to 
enter the labor market, ie , which differ between individuals, see Cogan (1981). 
Consumption of working type 2 individuals exceeds cˆ , Hence, preferences of type 2 
individuals are represented by the utility function, 2u , 
 
(8) )()( 22,2 zfelgcu iwwiw +−+= ,  
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Their accumulated cost of entering the labor market equals 
 
(9) 
2
22
1
wnα
 
 
Hence, the working disabled with the highest entry cost equals wn2α . α  is a parameter which 
determines the size of the entry cost. Working type 2 individuals receive a transfer, a , from 
the government. Consumption is given by  
 
(10) ahwtc w +−= 222 )1(  
 
Their indirect utility is given by  
 
(11)  )()()1( 222,2 zfelgahwtv iiw +−++−=   
 
The labor supply for type 2 individuals with a sufficiently high disutility for working equals 
zero. Hence, consumption of non-working type 2 individuals equals transfers, b.  
 
(12) bc nw =2  
 
These transfers can be lower than cˆ . Hence, the indirect utility of non-working type 2 
individuals is given by 
 
(13) )()()(2 zfTgbSv nw ++= , where S’ > 1 and S’’ < 0 when cc nw ˆ2 < . 
 
The marginal utility derived from public good provision is equalized between all individuals. 
The study also assume that productivity and tax revenue generated is unaffected by the 
provision of public goods. These assumptions are crucial for results, see Sandmo (1998) and 
Kaplow (1996). 
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The equilibrium condition which determines the number of working type 2 individuals is 
given by  
 
(14)  )()()()1( 2222 TgbSnlgahwt w +=−++− α . 
 
Equation (14) illustrates how income taxation and transfers to non-working disabled distorts 
the extensive margin labor/ leisure choice. Transfers to working disabled however contribute 
to neutralize extensive margin distortions. Equation (14) determines wn2 as a function of t ,b
and a .     
 
(15) ),,(2 abtnn w =  
 
The specification of utility functions implies that there are no potential welfare gains 
connected to redistributing income between working individuals.    
2.2 The government’s optimization problem  
The government maximizes an individualistic social welfare function given the budget 
constraint of the government. The welfare function is found by multiplying indirect utility 
functions, equation (7), (11) and (13) with the relevant number of individuals, equation (15).  
 
(16)
[ ] [ ] +−++−+++−− 22221111,,, )),,((2
1)()1(),,()())(())(()1( abtnlgahwtabtnzftlgtlTwtnMaks
abtz
α  
)())()())(,,(( 2 zfNTgbSabtnn ++−  
Given the budget constraint  
 
(17) aabtnbabtnnqzhtwabtntlTtwn ),,()),,((),,())(( 222111 +−+=+− . 
 
The Lagrangian is given by  
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(18)
[ ] [ ] +−++−+++−−= 22221111 )),,((2
1)()1(),,()())(())(()1( abtnlgahwtabtnzftlgtlTwtnL α
)())()())(,,(( 2 zfNTgbSabtnn ++−
[ ]aabtnbabtnnqzhtwabtntlTtwn ),,()),,((),,())(( 222111 −−−−+−+ µ . 
 
The price of public goods measured in units of private consumer goods equals q, and the 
shadow value of public funds is denotedµ . Restrictions on )( 1lg , )(1 tl , )(zf and )(bS  imply 
that the Lagrangian is concave, see appendix A. The first order conditions and calculations of 
MCF are presented in appendix B. Key equations to estimate MCF is presented below.             
3. MCF measures  
The MCF is defined as the shadow value of public funds divided by the average marginal 
utility of income,λ , in most recent studies. The λ - parameter is necessary in the definition 
to convert the welfare effect of public funds into units of income, which is measured in terms 
of consumption goods. Hence, the MCF can be interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution 
between private and public income, i.e. the number of goods consumed by privates the 
government is willing to forgo to increase the consumption of public goods with one. The 
MCF defined as the shadow value of public funds divided by the average marginal utility of 
income is presented in equation (19).  
 
(19)  λ
µ
=MCF
 
 
The shadow value of public funds is determined by the intensive margin labor supply 
elasticity and the income tax rate, see appendix B:   
(20) 






−∂
∂
−
=
)1(
1
1
1
1
t
t
h
w
w
h
µ
. 
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where the after- tax wage rate equals 1)1( wtw −= . µ tends to unity when the intensive margin 
labor supply elasticity tends to zero.     
 
The average marginal utility of income, which is the denominator on the right- hand side of 
equation (19), is given by equation (21).   
 
(21)  21
2221 )(
nn
b
Snnnn ww
+
∂
∂
−++
=λ
 
 
The average marginal utility of income is determined by labor force data and the marginal 
utility of income for non-working disabled,
b
S
∂
∂ , given by: 
(22)  1
)1(
1
),,(
)(
1
1
1
22
>






−∂
∂
−












−
+−
∂
∂
−
=
∂
∂
t
t
h
w
w
h
abtNN
htwab
b
n
b
S
 if 01 >
∂
∂
w
h
, 0>t , 0<
∂
∂
b
n  and  22htwab −> ,  
Equation (22) shows that there are two reasons why transfers to non-working disabled are 
restricted so that their marginal utility of income exceeds one. First, collecting tax revenue to 
finance such transfers distorts the intensive margin labor/ leisure choice of working 
individuals. This effect is given by the denominator on the right- hand side of equation (22). 
Second, transfers distort the extensive margin labor/ leisure choice of disabled, given by the 
numerator on the right- hand side of equation (22).   
 
The optimal choice of transfers to working disabled, a , is chosen so that the welfare gains due 
to entry are balanced against the welfare cost of collecting and redistributing tax revenue.   
 
(23)  
),,(),,()( 22 abtnabtnhtwaba
n
−=+−
∂
∂ µµ
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The right- hand side of (23) equals the cost of a marginal increase in public funds spent on 
transfers to working disabled, wn2µ , minus the direct increase in utility of working disabled, 
which equals wn2 , cf. equation (15). This equals the left- hand side, which is the welfare gain 
related to the drop in transfers to disabled as several disabled decide to enter the labor force, 
)( 22htwaba
n
+−
∂
∂µ . Inserting the solution for a into Equation (22) determines the marginal 
utility of income for non-working disabled,
b
S
∂
∂  as a function of labor force data and the 
shadow value of public funds, µ .    
 
(24)  ),,(
)),,((
2
2
abtnn
abtnn
b
S
µ
µ
−
−
=
∂
∂
 
 
Equation (19), (20), (21) and (24) determines MCF defined by equation (19) as a function of 
labor force data, the intensive margin labor supply elasticity, and the income tax rate.  
 
The study also calculates MCF based on the modified Samuelson rule. This modified 
Samuelson rule is found by adding consumers’ marginal rate of substitution between private 
and public goods, zcMRS , and setting this equal to the marginal rate of transformation, 
zcMRT , multiplied with the welfare maximizing cost- adjusting factor, msMCF . This approach 
excludes shortcomings connected to various definitions of MCF, see Jacobs (2018). A 
comparison with the definition in equation (19) is however useful for interpretation of results.  
 
(25)  qMCF
b
S
z
f
nn
z
fnn msww =
∂
∂
∂
∂
−+
∂
∂
+ )()( 2221 , 
Calculations, which are presented in appendix C, imply that 
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The left- hand side of equation (25) equals the accumulated marginal rate of substitution 
between private and public goods. The right- hand side equals the marginal rate of 
transformation, q , multiplied with the welfare maximizing marginal cost of public funds, 
msMCF . Inserting equation (21) into equation (19), and comparing this expression with 
equation (26) shows that these two approaches differ slightly when the marginal utility of 
income for the poor group exceeds one. Equation (24) into equation (26) implies that  
 
(27) 
12
12
nn
nnMCFms +
+
=
µ
.  
 
It follows directly from equation (27) that msMCF  is larger than one when the vaue of public 
funds,µ , exceeds one.   
3.1. No extensive margin distortions  
This section calculates MCF when taxation distorts the intensive margin choice of labor 
supply, but not extensive margin choices. The scenario is implemented into the model 
framework by assuming that the disutility of entering the labor market is substantial for all 
individuals in the poor group, i.e.α is large.  
 
The first order condition w.r.t. t  implies that the marginal welfare cost of raising tax revenue 
by increasing the tax rate on labor income equals the shadow value of the government budget 
constraint, µ . This welfare cost, which is determined by equation (20), exceeds one when 
taxation distorts the supply of labor. Equation (14) implies that the number of working 
disabled becomes marginal when the disutility of working is substantial. Hence, equation (24) 
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implies that b
S
∂
∂ is approachingµ when the number of working disabled is approaching zero. 
Hence,     
 
(28) 
µ=
∂
∂
b
S
.  
 
Equation (28) and the first order condition w.r.t. the supply of public goods imply that  
 
(29) µ=
∂
∂
=∂
∂
+
b
S
q
z
fnn )( 21
.  
 
Equation (29) shows that the marginal welfare cost of raising tax revenue, µ , equals the 
marginal welfare gain of redistributing tax revenue, b
S
∂
∂ , in optimum. The alternative way to 
spend public funds has to matches this welfare gain. Hence, the marginal welfare cost of 
raising tax revenue equals the marginal welfare gain of public goods provision. This marginal 
welfare gain exceeds the resource cost of public goods provision as the cost of raising tax 
revenue exceeds one.   
 
The implication for MCF is however more complex as “marginal welfare gains” is measured 
as “willingness to forgo private income/consumption” within cost- benefit studies. Hence, the 
marginal welfare gain of public goods is transformed to the governments’ willingness to 
sacrifice private consumption for one additional unit of public goods by dividing with the 
average marginal utility of income,λ . Hence, equation (29) is transformed to   
 
(30) 
MCFqz
fnn
=∂
∂
+
λ
)( 21
.  
 
The left- hand side of equation (30) is a measure of the governments’ willingness to pay for 
public goods measured in units of the private goods. This equals the marginal rate of 
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transformation between public and private goods, q , multiplied with MCF defined as the 
governments’ marginal rate of substitution between money in the public and the private 
sector. The shadow value of public funds, µ , is given by equation (20). Equation (19), (21), 
(28) and 02 =wn  implies that  
 
(31) 1
21
21
>
+
+
=
nn
nn
MCF
µ
µ
.  
 
The MCF exceeds one as the value of public funds,µ , exceeds the average marginal utility of 
income,λ . The numerator in the definition of MCF, µ , equals the welfare gain of transferring 
public funds to non- working disabled, b
S
∂
∂ . This gain exceeds the average marginal utility 
of income. Hence, the MCF exceeds one in this case to match the higher welfare gain of 
transfers to non- working. The willingness to pay for public goods measured in units of 
private consumer goods, the left- hand side of equation (30), is reduced as the average 
marginal utility of income is increased. The reduction in MCF, on the right- hand side, is 
however identical. The formula for msMCF is identical with the formula in equation (26). 
Hence, extensive margin distortions do not influence calculations of MCF based on the 
modified Samuelson rule. Note that the formula for msMCF  resembles the formula for MCF 
based on the definition in equation (19). Hence msMCF  exceeds one for the same reasons as 
for MCF based on equation (19).    
4. Results   
This section calculates MCF for a large welfare state country, Norway, and a small welfare state 
country, the US. Most countries will have a relative size of the welfare state between these two 
countries. The special case where taxation does not distort the extensive margin labor choice is 
presented in section 4.1. Section 4.2 presents results when taxation distorts both intensive and 
extensive margins. Results within each scenario are calibrated to labor force data to illustrate the 
impact on MCF. It is assumed that parameters and functional forms are calibrated so that 
different solutions fit with data on stocks of individuals within each group, and relevant labor 
17 
supply responses. The difference between these scenarios should not be interpreted as changes 
generated by policy, as such changes in policy may alter labor force outcomes.      
4.1. Intensive margin distortions     
This section report results for scenarios where taxation distorts the intensive margin choice of 
labor supply, but not extensive margin choices. Labor force data is presented in table 1, see also 
appendix D.  Scenarios with intensive margin labor supply elasticity’s of 0.1 and 0.2 for the US 
and Norway are presented3. The total tax rate on labor income is found by an assessment of the 
tax system within each country. Table 1 reports scenarios where MCF approximately equals 1.1 
and 1.05 for the US with an intensive margin labor supply elasticity of 0.2 and 0.1, respectively. 
Estimates for Norway are slightly higher mainly due to a higher tax rate4.    
 
Table 1. Labor force data and MCF for Norway and the US, no extensive margin distortions  
Country 
1n  2n  wn2  hElw  t  µ  
b
S
∂
∂
 MCF = λ
µ  msMCF   
Norway  2,619 1,349 0 0,1 0,5 1,111 1,111 1,07 1,07 
Norway  2,619 1,349 0 0,2 0,5 1,25 1,25 1,15 1,17 
USA  156,76 70 0 0,1 0,4 1,071 1,071 1,05 1,05 
USA  156,76 70 0 0,2 0,4 1,154 1,154 1,10 1,11 
4.2. Intensive and extensive margin distortions   
This section report results for scenarios where taxation distorts both the intensive and the 
extensive margin choice of labor supply. The MCF is determined by equation (19), (20), (21) 
and (24). Equation (20) and (23) implies that 22htwab −> , i.e. that transfers to non- working 
in the disabled group is larger than transfers net of taxes for working individuals in the 
disabled group. This result combined with equation (20) and (22) implies that 1>∂
∂
b
S . Note 
that Saez (2002) find that income should be taxed with negative rates at low income levels to 
stimulate labor force participation.        
                                                     
3 Note that the uncompensated labor supply elasticity equals the compensated labor supply elasticity with quasilinear 
preferences. Empirical estimates of the uncompensated elasticity are close to zero. Hence, the compensated elasticity has to 
be close to zero.     
4 Note that calculations based on Stone-Geary utility generates almost identical MCF estimates. Hence, assuming quasilinear 
preferences is not crucial for these results. 
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Data on how many disabled (and others on social welfare) that are working is required to 
calculate MCF in this case. The value of wn2  is obtained by assessments of data even though 
wn2  is an endogenous variable within the model framework. It is estimated that approximately 
30 percent of individuals with severe disability within EU countries chose to work, see 
Eurostat (2001). A substantial share of these individuals receives social welfare benefits. It is 
however difficult to pinpoint the exact number. Two scenarios are analyzed where 10 and 20 
percent of individuals classified as disabled are in the workforce. These individuals are 
assumed to be included in the labor force when data is presented. Results and adjusted labor 
force date is presented in table 2. The shadow value of public funds equals approximately 
1.11 and 1.25 (1.07 and 1.15) when the tax rate equals 0.5 (0.4) and the intensive margin labor 
supply elasticity equals 0.1 and 0.2, respectively. The shadow value of public funds is not 
influenced by extensive margin distortions because distortion created by the income tax can 
be completely neutralized by adjustments in transfers to working disabled. Hence, results are 
not sensitive to changes in the extensive margin labor supply elasticity.   
 
Table 2. Labor force data and MCF for Norway and the US, intensive and extensive margin 
distortions 
Country 
1n  2n  wn2  hElw  t  µ  
b
S
∂
∂
 MCF = λ
µ  msMCF  
Norway 20 % 2,282 1,686 0,337 0,1 0,5 1,111 1,143 1,06 1,06 
Norway 10 % 2,47 1,5 0,15 0,1 0,5 1,111 1,125 1,07 1,07 
USA 20 % 139,26 87,5 17,5 0,1 0,4 1,071 1,090 1,04 1,04 
USA 10 % 148,98 77,78 7,78 0,1 0,4 1,071 1,0795 1,05 1,05 
Norway 20 % 2,282 1,686 0,337 0,2 0,5 1,25 1,333 1,12 1,14 
Norway 10 % 2,47 1,5 0,15 0,2 0,5 1,25 1,286 1,14 1,16 
USA 20 % 139,26 87,5 17,5 0,2 0,4 1,154 1,200 1,09 1,10 
USA 10 % 148,98 77,78 7,78 0,2 0,4 1,154 1,174 1,10 1,10 
 
Table 2 report estimates of MCF below 1.11 for the US economy. Estimates for the 
Norwegian economy are below 1.16. The formula for msMCF is identical with the formula in 
equation (26). Hence, extensive margin distortions do not influence calculations of MCF 
based on the modified Samuelson rule. The explanation is that such distortions contributes to 
lower the value of public funds. The extensive margin distortion is only partly neutralized by 
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transfers to working individuals in the poor group because collecting tax revenue to finance 
transfers create distortions in the intensive margin labor/ leisure choice of working 
individuals. Hence, it is optimal to scale down on redistribution to non- working to prevent 
both intensive and extensive margin distortions. The reduction in transfers increases the 
marginal utility of income for welfare recipients. The higher marginal utility of income 
contributes to increase, and hence, restore the value of public funds. Note that the formula for 
msMCF  resembles the formula for MCF based on the definition in equation (19). Hence
msMCF  exceeds one for the same reasons as for MCF based on equation (19).   
5. Conclusion   
Kleven and Kreiner (2006) estimate that the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) equals 2.20 
within basic scenarios of the Danish economy when taxation distorts labor force participation. 
Kleven and Kreiner (2006), however, do not consider welfare maximizing solutions where 
social transfers to non-workers, or transfers to social welfare recipients that decide to work, 
alleviate such distortions. The present study explores how MCF is influenced by extensive 
margin distortions when targeted social security transfers redistribute income so that the 
welfare is maximized. The study shows that MCF within the US and the Norwegian economy 
should be in the interval 1.04-1.16 when social transfers alleviate such distortions. The study 
also shows that extensive margin distortions have a marginal impact on MCF estimates when 
taxation is combined with such social transfers.     
 
The vast literature on MCF consists of a range of contributions which deserve to be 
mentioned. A discussion and assessment of all important contributions is however beyond the 
scope of the present study. The study illustrates the importance of the marginal welfare gain 
of the alternative use of public funds. The alternative use is crucial as the marginal welfare 
gain of public goods provision have to match the welfare gain of this alternative use within 
optimized solutions. Hence, future research could reexamine previous results on MCF when 
the alternative use of public funds is considered in more detail. Future research could e.g. 
examine the impact on MCF when social transfers is combined with employment programs, 
social security fraud and mobility between tagged groups, see Parson (1996) and Jacquet 
(2014).         
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Appendix:  
A. The second order condition: 
The second order condition is satisfied if the Lagrangian is concave. This condition is satisfied if 
second order derivatives are negative, and that second order derivatives dominate over cross 
derivatives within conditions for concavity.   
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Results are limited to cases where these second order derivatives dominate over cross derivatives 
within conditions for concavity.    
 
B. The first order conditions: 
The Envelope Theorem is employed to calculate the impact of a marginal change in the tax rate. The 
equilibrium condition which determines the number of disabled that are working is employed to 
calculate the impact of a marginal change in transfers.   
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The budget constraint implies that     
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Equation (B 3) gives  
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The numerical illustration, however, require some additional calculations. First, the definition of 
leisure,  
(B 10) 11 hTl −= , 
 imply that  
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Inserting (B12) and (B 15) into equation (B 7) gives 
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The marginal utility of income for non-working disabled, 
b
S
∂
∂ , is included in the formula for the 
average marginal utility of income. Equation (B 9) implies that  
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Equation (B 16), (B 19) and (21) determines MCF as a function of labor force data, the intensive 
margin labor supply elasticity, and the income tax rate.   
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C. MCF based on the modified Samuelson rule    
The point of departure is the first order equation (B 6) 
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Hence, msMCF  is given by the expression  
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D. Labor force data  
The case of US is illustrated by implementing data for 2013. The number on social disability transfers 
(app. 9 mill according to Social security administration), unemployment (8 million in 2015 according 
to the US Department of labor), on Medicare (50 million according to the Kaiser Family foundation), 
and public pensions (Estimate of 3 million). The total number on social benefit transfers, 2n , amounts 
to 70 million. The number of employed amounts to 156.76 million individuals according to OECD. 
Sensitivity tests are conducted which excludes people on Medicare from the group on social benefit 
transfers. The impact on MCF is modest.    
 
The case of Norway is illustrated by implementing data for 2013. The number on social disability 
transfers, unemployment benefit, sickness transfers and public pensions, 2n , amounts to 1349 
thousand. The total number of working individuals, 1n , amounts to 2619 thousand. One may however 
argue that individuals on public pension should be excluded from the disabled group as many have 
accumulated wealth that can be consumed. This wealth effect as well as their desire to consume may 
depress their marginal utility of income.    
 
The income tax wedge on average income earners amounts to 31.5 percent in the US, and 37 percent 
in Norway in 2014 according to OECD. The sales tax ranges from 0 to almost 10 percent in the US. 
VAT on most consumer goods in Norway equals 25 percent. There is also substantial taxation of 
corporate income in both countries, as well as real estate taxation in the US. Immervoll et al. (2007) 
report total marginal tax rates above 60 percent for other Nordic countries. Total tax revenue as a share 
of GDP only amounts to 25.4 percent of GDP in the US and 40.8 percent in Norway in 2013 according 
to OECD. The average tax rate on labor earnings is larger as the tax on capital earnings is lower.  
The effective tax rate on labor earnings is also influenced by public spending, tax deductions and tax 
evasion. Tax payments to finance public pensions in Norway resemble mandatory savings schemes, as 
income tax payments are linked with pension transfers. Hence, one may argue that such taxes should 
be exempted from the effective marginal tax rate. One may also argue that certain types of public 
spending function as subsidies on private consumption. Public roads may for example function as a 
subsidy on the purchase of cars. Public education stimulates investment in human capital, and hence, 
earnings. It is however difficult to determine the exact impact on the effective marginal tax rate. An 
overall assessment suggests that the total effective tax rate on labor earnings amounts to approximately 
40 percent in the US, and 50 percent in Norway.      
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